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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following: Following a dream and an old treasure map, Charles
convinced many of his friends to invest their life savings into a search for an old
abandoned shipwreck that sunk centuries ago off the northern Atlantic coast. After
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars and decades of his life hunting, Charles
finally discovered the motherlode. He immediately proceeded to federal court in
order to make a claim to the wreck and its artifacts. The state in whose waters the
wreck was found heard about the new discovery and immediately sought to have
the claim removed to State court via the Eleventh Amendment' in an effort to take
some, if not all, of Charles' new discovery for State purposes.
Traditionally, claims to abandoned shipwrecks fall under the jurisdiction of the
federal courts as required by the Constitution.' A person or organization who finds
a wreck will usually make a claim to the discovery in federal court under either the
common law of salvage3 or the common law of finds.4 However, in 1987,
Congress passed the Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA),5 which vests title in all
shipwrecks discovered to the state in whose territorial waters the wreck was found,
provided the ship was abandoned.6 Thus, the ASA deprives private salvors of any
rights to a shipwreck meeting the requirements of the ASA, regardless of the
energy and time invested searching for the ship.7 In addition to the ASA, the
Eleventh Amendment's provision that a state cannot be sued by one of its own
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X1 ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
2. See U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. I (stating that "the judicial Power [of the United States] shall
extend to ... all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.").
3. See Sabrina L. Mclaughlin, Roots, Relics and Recovery: What Went Wrong With the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 149, 160 (1995).
4. See id.
5. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2106 (West 1998).
6. See id. at § 2105 (articulating that all abandoned shipwrecks within state territorial waters fall
under the purview of the federal ASA).
7. See generally id. (granting states complete title to abandoned shipwrecks discovered in their
territories, implying no grant of rights to private salvors).
citizens in federal court' has often proved troublesome for salvors in times past.'
By removing a maritime or admiralty claim out of federal court through asserting
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, states have historically been successful
in depriving salvors of any rights to abandoned shipwrecks discovered in state
territorial waters."° Thus, claimants were often deprived of the more objective and
competent federal courts. '
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.'2 ("DSR") is the latest case to analyze
the controversial issue of whether and to what extent the Eleventh Amendment
applies to admiralty/maritime cases. 3 It sets a new standard of federal jurisdiction
in admiralty cases, stating that a state cannot use the Eleventh Amendment where
the state has no preexisting possessory claim to the res at the time the case was
brought to federal court.' 4 Hence, in light of DSR, as long as the State was without
any valid right of possession to the wreck before Charles made his claim in federal
court, Charles and his investors will likely be spared from having their claim
removed to State court. The result is that Charles and his investors will have an
increased chance of making a successful claim to their wreck and will thus reap the
rewards of their risk, devotion, and investments.
This Note will review DSR and consider its consequences to those who
discover abandoned aqueous shipwrecks and their artifacts who then seek to make
a claim to the wreck and/or its artifacts. Part II discusses the history of the
application of Article III § 2, clause 1, and the Eleventh Amendment to in rem
admiralty cases.' 5 Part III sets forth the progression of federal shipwreck law from
traditional admiralty law through the creation of the ASA, and also briefly explores
the law(s) of various other jurisdictions.'6 Part IV recites the facts and procedural
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Eleventh Amendment immunity has been judicially extended to
include suits by citizens suing their state of citizenship in federal court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 20 (1890).
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Zych v. Wrecked Vessel Believed To Be The "Lady Elgin", 960 F.2d 665, 670 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the State of Illinois appropriately used the Eleventh Amendment to remove an
abandoned shipwreck case out of federal court); Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wreck & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1983) (using the Eleventh Amendment to
remove a claim for a shipwreck discovered in State waters out of federal court); Subaqueous
Exploration & Archaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp 597,614
(D. Md. 1983) (mandating that the federal court had no jurisdiction over property discovered in
Maryland's territorial waters because the State had not waived it's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
See also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682 (1982) (declaring that "[t]he
[lower] court did not have power... to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's
consent [because of the Eleventh Amendment].").
I1. See David C. Frederick, A LOOK AT ... Sunken Treasure; Legally, the Waters are Murky,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 1998, at C03.
12. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
13. See id. at 496.
14. See id. at 500.
15. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 41-126 and accompanying text.
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history of DSR,"7 ensued by an examination of the reasoning and opinions of the
majority and concurring opinions in Part V.' Part VI explores the probable
impacts of DSR on bankruptcy law, the states, commercial salvors, and other
various interests and parties.' Part VII adjourns by observing that although DSR
chartered a good beginning towards clarifying admiralty cases involving the
Eleventh Amendment, additional clarification is required if the government truly
wishes to eliminate the various negative effects of abandoned shipwreck law as it
currently stands.2 °
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS APPLIED
TO IN REM ADMIRALTY CASES
A. Article III, § 2, clause I
The Constitution provides that federal courts have authority to hear "all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction". 2' Although this appears to be a clear
vestiture of power, the original intent of the framers in granting federal jurisdiction
over admiralty cases remains a mystery. 2 Some of the founding fathers, however,
did write on this issue after the Constitution's passage.23 Over the years the Court
has used the justification that the federal courts must be vested with exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction in order to provide "uniformity" in admiralty and maritime
law, but this has been hindsight application.24 Inferentially, it is because of the lack
17. See infra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 147-80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 181-258 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. art. Ili, § 2, cl. I.
22. See David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR.
L. & CoM. 1, 2 (1997).. Despite scholars statements to the contrary, it is interesting that the Court in
DSR declared that the "need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation was recognized
throughout the Constitutional Convention". Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
23. See Bederman, supra note 22, at 2. Alexander Hamilton stated that admiralty jurisdiction
needed to be exclusive in federal courts in order to provide uniformity. See id. at 3 (quoting Federalist
No. 80, at 478). However, there is current scholarly debate as to whether uniformity was truly the
framer's original intent. See id. (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). Jensen opined that federal
congressional law preempts state maritime law and that even in the absence of positive congressional
action, general maritime law principles preempt state law; all of this was in an effort to promote
harmony and uniformity in maritime law. See id. at 215-16.
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of understanding as to why the founding fathers wanted admiralty cases to have
original jurisdiction in federal courts in the first place that the Supreme Court has
had a difficult time defining where the federal courts' admiralty/maritime
jurisdiction ends and where the states' begins. 25 Clearly, this is partially why DSR
posed a problem for the Court.26
B. The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
Similar to the mystery behind the intent of Article III, §2, clause 1 of the
Constitution, there are also unanswered questions as to why the drafters of the
Eleventh Amendment failed to mention admiralty or maritime cases as being the
subject of state sovereign immunity.27 Historical sources do, however, make clear
that the original intent of the Eleventh Amendment, in general, was to "limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts over suits in which states were named as defendants
without their consent.
28
Currently, two main theories are circulating in academic circles to explain why
state sovereign immunity has been encapsulated in the Eleventh Amendment.2 9 The
first is that sovereign immunity preexisted the constitutional framing, which, after
Chilsolm v. Georgia,3" had to be written to be maintained." The second explana-
tion is that the Amendment was created to fix an inadvertent error by the founding
fathers who accidentally granted too much jurisdiction to the federal courts in
Article III of the Constitution. 2
Whatever the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment, there is definitely a long
"convoluted history of admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment . . ."" At least one
scholar believes that this is because of the Court's anti-textualist approach to the
Eleventh Amendment through the years as well as its failure to follow originalist
25. Compare, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1874) (submitting that there
was no Constitutional restraint on the states legislating over areas of maritime issues that were "local"
in nature) with Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216 (preventing states from even regulating over local issues if the
state law in any way interfered with the uniform nature of general or federal maritime law).
26. See generally Deep Sea Research Inc., 523 U.S. at 497-500 (comparing previous Supreme Court
maritime cases in an effort to determine the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction versus state
jurisdiction and state sovereign immunity, purposefully avoiding the issue of whether the Federal ASA
preempts California's conflicting maritime law).
27. See David J. Bederman, Admiraltv and the Eleventh Amendment, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935,
936 (1997) (proposing that drafters of the Eleventh Amendment may have purposefully left admiralty
and maritime cases out of the bestowal of sovereign immunity to the states).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (maintaining that a state could be sued by one of its own citizens
in federal court).
3 I. See Bederman, supra note 27, at 936.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 938.
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themes.34 In this scholar's opinion, the courts have wrongfully expanded the reach
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, removing admiralty cases out of the
federal system in ways never imagined by the original drafters. 5
As originally drafted, the Eleventh Amendment precluded suits commenced
or prosecuted against a state by citizens of a foreign state or a foreign country.36
However, striving to provide uniformity in the Eleventh Amendment's applicability
to the states, through Hans v. Louisiana,37 the Court extended state sovereign
immunity to suits against a state by one of its own citizens. 38 As it stands now, the
"history of admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, far from being marginal or
irrelevant to the balance of power between states and the federal courts, is actually
central to that dispute.' 39 Hence, the Eleventh Amendment stands as an important
symbol of the preservation of federalism, especially as applied to admiralty cases."
III. ABANDONED SHIPWRECK LAW-A HISTORY AND
COMPARISON
A. Traditional Admiralty Law
One of the oldest living bodies of law in use today, the law governing
shipwrecks and shipwreck discoveries in the United States is admiralty (or
maritime) law.4 Admiralty law utilizes a proceeding which does not exist in
common law - the in rem proceeding. 2 An in rem proceeding grants a person or
group bringing a maritime claim the rights to the tangible property at issue.4
Though it developed out of the common law, this maritime 'lien', as it is called, is
still the current method most often utilized to claim rights to a ship."
Largely utilizing the in rem proceeding, salvors traditionally make claims to
34. See id. at 936-37 (noting that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
over time has given the Amendment a "teleological gloss").
35. See id. at 938.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI
37. 134 U.S. I (1890).
38. See id. at 15 (reasoning that it would be a strain of the Constitution to suppose a state could by
sued in federal court by foreigners and outsiders, but not by one of its own citizens).
39. See Bederman, supra note 27, at 938.
40. See id.
41. See Drew F.T. Horrell, Telepossession is Nine-Tenths of the Law: The Emerging Industr. of
Deep Ocean Discover., 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 309, 317 (1991) (observing that modern admiralty law
developed through ancient laws followed in England and the British colonies).
42. See id. at 318.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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shipwrecks and their articles through one of two means: the law of salvage or the
law of finds.45 The law of salvage was created to give sailors the incentive to save
ships and other objects which are in danger of being sunk or otherwise destroyed
by accident or nature.46 The law of salvage compensates a salvor, who saves a ship
or other maritime object in peril, with a salvage award.47 In connection with the
law of salvage is the law of finds.48 Whereas the law of salvage requires the salvor
to reduce a threatened object to his or her sole possession in order to earn a salvage
award, the law of finds, conversely, allows for the discoverer of an object who
reduces the object to his or her sole possession to be deemed the new owner of the
discovered property.49 Thus, the two laws often overlap with the only difference
between the two being a determination to see if the object(s) are lost or abandoned
for an extended time.5 ° If they are, the law of finds is the proper law to apply and
it vests title in the abandoned property to the finder.5
B. State Intervention and The Submerged Lands Act
Prior to the creation of the ASA, states began attempts to gain control over the
submerged land that lay within their borders because states saw the "jackpot
discoveries" being made by salvors and finders of sunken property and because
they also wanted a piece of the action. 2 At the time of the ASA's passage, twenty-
seven states had enacted laws which effectively gave a respective state title to all
archeological finds made within its boundaries. 3 Furthermore, over thirty states
had their own legislation which regulated abandoned shipwrecks discovered within
state boundaries.54
In addition to states direct enactments which sought to divest treasure salvors
and finders of their admiralty rights in federal court, Congress passed the
Submerged Lands Act ("SLA") in 1953, which "gave the states title to submerged
lands and the natural resources thereon up to a distance of three miles from state
shores. 55 Although shipwrecks were not listed as one of the "natural resources"
to be managed by the states, many states nonetheless decided that the SLA included
such objects. 6 Under this false guise, states would often file restricted appearances
in maritime actions involving submerged shipwrecks in order to strip title away
45. See id. at 319-24.
46. See id. at 319. For further details on this law, see id. at 319-21.
47. See id. at 320.
48. See id. at 323.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 323-24.
52. See Mclaughlin, supra note 3, at 174.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 193.
55. See id. at 174 (citing Submerged Lands Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988 and Supp. 1993)).
56. See id. at 174-75.
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from the original finder. 7 The states were successful in this effort because by
intervening in the federal maritime claim, a state would use the Eleventh
Amendment protection of sovereign immunity. 8 All a state had to do was show
that it merely had a bare, "colorable claim" to title in order to successfully dismiss
the suit, thereby derailing a finders entire claim to a wreck.59
State-enacted legislation and the SLA thus created hard barriers for the private
treasure salvor. What made matters worse was that prior to the creation of the
ASA, persons brining a treasure claim in federal court would receive highly
differential treatment depending on the court in which the claim was brought. 6 All
of theses problems combined to result in a serious conflict between state police
power and federal maritime law.6
C. A Sampling of Abandoned Shipwreck Laws in Other Jurisdictions
1. California
California's current abandoned shipwreck law states that "[t]he title to all
abandoned shipwrecks and all archeological sites and historic resources on or in
the tide and submerged lands of California is vested in the state. 62 According to
the Code, this statute is to be given the broadest possible meaning,63 the result of
which is to render almost anything that could ever possibly be found in California's
territorial waters as being of sufficient interest to the State to automatically vest
title in it.64
As a catch all, California's Code states that "[a]ny submerged archeological
site or submerged historic resource remaining in state waters for more than 50 years
shall be presumed to be archeologically or historically significant".65 Through this
all-encompassing language, California could effectively claim a piece of trash that
had been under water for fifty years as of sufficient State concern to merit a
57. See id. at 175.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 174, 178 (stating that "[ultter discord characterized the judicial decisions of the pre-
ASA period.").
61. See id.
62. CAL. PUB. RES CODE § 6313 (WEST 1998).
63. See id.
64. See generally id. (using very generalized terms to describe the items protected, such as
"submerged object[s]" and "fixturels]").
65. See id.
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vestiture of ownership in the State.66 This overly expansive language was
originally one of the major issues litigated by DSR, the company claiming that
California's law conflicted with the federal ASA.67 Because it was so broad, the
district court pronounced the California statute void and stated that the ASA
preempted it.6"
2. North Carolina
In stark contrast to California's apparent desire to claim anything and
everything of any possible value as belonging to the state, North Carolina seems
to be flexible in sharing the benefits of abandoned shipwrecks discoveries with
others.69 For example, in the recent discovery of a ship called the Queen Anne's
Revenge, the State retained title to the ship and its artifacts.7" However, the State
awarded the commercial treasure hunters who found the wreck in State territorial
waters the rights to make books, films, videos, and software based on the wreck.7
Additionally, the State granted the company a permit to search for more treasure
ships in State waters and decided to split the cost of the previous search with the
company. 72 From the willingness demonstrated by the State in granting incentives
to salvors while simultaneously reaping benefits itself, North Carolina's shipwreck
law demonstrates an obvious elasticity which benefits both governmental and
commercial interests.73
3. The Laws of Various Nations
In England, the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 codified the country's
ownership interest in shipwrecks.74 Under this Act, items recovered from a wreck
66. This logical inference can be drawn from the Code because other than the fifty-year
presumption, the Code never defines what "archeologically or historically significant" means, stating
instead that one must interpret these terms in the broadest possible manner. See id.
67. See Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1357 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (stating that California code "[slection 6313s broad claim of title plainly conflicts with the title
to ships transferred to the states under the ASA"), aff'd en banc, 102 F.3d 372 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub non. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 1998).
68. See Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. at 1357.
69. See generally John Aloysius Farrell, Power Struggle Surfaces on Clains to Shipwrecks,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 1997, at AI (allowing for both the State and the discoverer to benefit from
a shipwreck find).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See generally id. (observing that both the State and the private salvors reaped important
benefits).
74. See Robert Miller, Charting the Future of Historic Shipwreck Legislation in California:
Application ofthe English Model in the Salvage of the Brother Jonathan, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 793,807-08 (1994) (defining these interests as "prevent[ing] the plundering of wrecked vessels
and provid[ing] for the proper distribution of salvaged property").
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are delivered to a disinterested third party.75 Failing to report a discovered artifact
to the third party is a summary offense.76 The third party makes a list of any items
found, and the true owner has twelve months to claim an item after paying salvage
and other fees." If not claimed within twelve months, however, the discovery
automatically becomes the property of the Crown by sovereign prerogative, and the
salvors are paid a salvage fee for their services. 8
In 1973, England passed a second act which was intended to specifically
protect historic shipwrecks because the government felt that salvors were damaging
or destroying too many historic wrecks in their search for gold and glory.79 The
Protection of Wrecks Act provides protection for the site of any vessel that is or
may be of historic, archeologic, or artistic worth."0 The Act makes the wreck area
off limits, it being an offense for any person to dive to the restricted area without
a State granted license."s The Secretary of State considers competent persons or
companies to carry out the excavation and then grants them a license to salvage. 2
The old 1894,Act still determines the amount of a salvage award, but the new 1973
Act is an added barrier to prevent historic shipwreck destruction. 3
France enacted the Decret in 1963.84 Under the Decret, a salvor receives an
award based on the value and importance of the discovery. 85 The State takes
automatic ownership of any discovery with historical significance while retaining
the option of allowing salvors to retain ownership. 6
Spain's abandoned shipwreck law grants the State ownership of any wreck
lying in its waters three years after the sinking. 7 Similar to the law in France, the
1962 Spanish law allows for archeological excavation in certain circumstances by
commercial or private salvors."8
Norway and Denmark enacted legislation in 1963 to protect historic
75. See id. at 808.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 810.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 811.
83. See id.
84. See Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper Ballast
for the States, 37 VILL. L. REV. 573, 588 (1992) (noting that the Decret subjects the ownership rights
of a person with property lost in the territorial waters of France to the Ministre de la Marchande, who
has the authority to dissolve those rights).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 588-89.
88. See id. at 589.
shipwrecks.89  However, these laws cover only the hull of a ship, leaving the
remainder of discovered ships subject to traditional salvage law.' °
Unlike most other nations, Italy has no specific legislation to deal with historic
shipwrecks."' The country does, however, have a law which protects all discover-
ies located within Italian borders.92
Lastly, Australia protects historic shipwrecks lying in their territorial waters
in accordance with the Australian Historic Shipwrecks Act.93 This legislation was
passed after various wrecks were destroyed by discoverers through blasting
efforts.94
4. International Historic Shipwreck Law
Prior to the twentieth century, the idea that shipwrecks were cultural property
led to the return of many artifacts found in international waters to their country of
origin.95 The twentieth century, with its developments in technology which makes
it easier than ever to discover and exploit the deep sea, has added a new need to
create internationally respected shipwreck laws.96 Hence, shipwrecks found in
international waters are subject to some international admiralty laws.97 However,
thus far the international community has been slow to protect wrecks discovered
in international waters.98
The primary source of international shipwreck law stems from conventions
held by the United Nations ("U.N.").99 The U.N. held various conferences, each
called the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), from
the 1950's through the 1980's."°  Most current international shipwreck law
developed through the UNCLOS conventions.'' The UNCLOS convention of
89. See id.
90. See id.
91 : See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 591.
94. See id.
95. See Sean R. Nicholson, Mutiny as to the Bounty: International Law's Failing Preservation
Efforts Regarding Shipwrecks and TheirArtifacts Located in hIternational Waters, 66 UMKC L. REV.
135, 141 (1997) (observing that most nations prior to this century followed the tradition of returning
cultural artifacts based on a respect for a nation's cultural heritage).
96. See id.
97. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
98. See Nicholson, supra note 95, at 153.
99. See id.
100. See Horrell, supra note 4 1, at 347-50 (setting forth the international rules in regards to historic
and non-historic abandoned shipwrecks discovered in international waters). See generally Louis B.
Sohn, Managing the Law of the Sea: Ambassador Pardo's Forgotten Second Idea, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 285, (1997) (brewing through the specifics of the UNCLOS conventions and their
effects on current international admiralty law).
101. See generally Nicholson, supra note 95, at 153 (recognizing that the U.N. has taken the
responsibility "to place restrictions on what finders can do with wrecks and their treasure.").
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1982 was the true first modern international law to respect shipwrecks and their
articles discovered in international waters. ° 2 Through this convention, interna-
tional UNCLOS laws protect shipwrecks found in international waters which sank
before 1533 AD, while those occurring after 1533 have no such protection.03
In addition to the U.N. Conferences, further protection for abandoned
shipwrecks may come from the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 UNESCO
Convention."° However, these two conventions are limited in that they have been
traditionally used to protect items determined to be cultural property.' Neverthe-
less, because many consider shipwrecks to be cultural property, these two
Conventions can also extend to shelter shipwrecks."°
D. The ASA
Congressional enactment of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act ("ASA") of
1987 07 was an opportunity for legislative clarification of the extent to which the
states were to have control over abandoned shipwrecks.° 8 The states had been
using their own laws as well as the SLA to strip ownership away from those who
discovered shipwrecks."° In addition, prior to the ASA the federal courts were
utterly confused at how to decide shipwreck cases, especially when states would
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 0 Thus, Congress presented the ASA to
provide simplification and clarification, it being the prevailing law that courts,
states, and all others could look to for guidance in deciding how to approach
abandoned shipwreck claims."' The ASA replaced the SLA and currently
preempts salvors rights to use the Law of Salvage or Finds as a means to claim an
102. See id. at 153-54 (establishing that "ltlhe seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof.
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction ... as well as the resources of the area. are the common
heritage of mankind."). This Convention further proceeded to create Article 149 and Article 303 which
specifically protect finds in international waters of archaeological or historical significance. See id. at
154.
103. See Horrell, supra note 41. at 351-50.
104. See Nicholson, supra note 95, at 155-56.
105. See id. (listing the additional protections afforded abandoned shipwrecks under these two
conventions).
106. See id. at 155.
107. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2106 (West 1998) (codification of the ASA).
108. See Mclaughlin, supra note 3, at 180.
109. See infra note 51-60 and accompanying text.
110. See Mclaughlin, siupra note 3. at 180.
I1l. See id.
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abandoned shipwreck discovered in state waters.' 2 Despite all the hype over the
easy new ASA, hindsight reveals that the ASA is not the light in the darkness that
Congress intended it to be." 3
1. Organization and Scope of the ASA
The ASA vests title to the United States to all abandoned" 4 shipwrecks' that
are: "(1) embedded" 6 in submerged lands of a State; (2) embedded in coralline
formations.., on submerged lands of a State; or (3) on submerged lands of a State
and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register [of
Historic Places]."' " After the shipwreck is determined to meet the above criteria,
the United States transfers title to the ship and its artifacts to the state in whose
aqueous borders the property was discovered." 8
Once a state has ownership of a shipwreck, the ASA charges the state with the
responsibility to manage the wreck and its artifacts and to provide access to the
ship and its artifacts for recreationalists, educationalists, sport divers, and other
interested groups, as well as to the public in general.' The state is to manage the
site, the vessel, and any artifacts in line with the stated purposes of the ASA to:
"protect natural resources . . .] guarantee recreational exploration of shipwreck
sites; and .. . allow for appropriate public and private sector recovery of
shipwrecks consistent with the protection of historical values and the environmen-
112. See Horrell, supra note 41, at 347 (labeling the effect of the ASA as removing all abandoned
and historical shipwrecks from traditional federal admiralty law and placing such claims under historic
preservation law): see also 43 U.S.C.A. § 2106 (West 1998) (stating that "[tihe law of salvage and the
law of finds shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks to which [the ASA] applies.").
113. See, e.g.. Mclaughlin, supra note 3, at 180 (complaining that the ASA is not as clear as its
proponents had suggested and that "the sponsors of the ASA prized simplicity over forethought.").
114. Only abandoned ships fall under the penumbra of the ASA. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2106
(West 1998) (referring only to abandoned shipwrecks). Unfortunately, the ASA does not define the
term "abandoned", but inferentially it connotes ships discovered in state submerged territory which are
deserted and which have been relinquished by the original owner(s) without any intention of retention.
See 43 U.S.C.A. § 2101 (West 1998); see also Deep Sea Research. Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 883
F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd en bane, 102 F.3d 372 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub
hont. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998). A negative inference of the definition
provided by the ASA is that the only ships which are not bound by the Statute are those which are either
found lying on the top of the soil of submerged lands, or those which are not eligible to be registered
in the National Register. Id. Abandoned ships not falling under the ASA. however, are subject to the
traditional admiralty laws of salvage and finds, laws over which federal courts retain exclusive
jurisdiction. Id.
115. "Shipwrecks" under the ASA includes the actual vessel and any cargo or other contents of the
wreck. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (West 1998).
116. The ASA defines "embedded" as "firmly affixed in the submerged lands or coralline formations
such that the use of tools of excavation is required in order to move the bottom sediments to gain access
to the shipwreck, its cargo, and any part thereof,"). Id.
117. /i. at § 2105 (West 1998).
118. See id.
119. See id. at §§ 2101. 2103 (West 1998).
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tal integrity of the shipwrecks and the sites."' 
2 1
2. The ASA as a Cultural Property Law
The ASA closely parallels art law, otherwise known as cultural property law,
in that it seeks to protect sentimental antiquities.' 2' Traditional cultural property
law asks the question: "Who should own the past?"' 22 This is increasingly an
important query because nations are largely defined through the heritage of relics
they create over time. 23 Traditional cultural property principles world-wide follow
the belief that the state should own cultural property, not free-market parties. 24
Opponents of the ASA, however, decry the ASA as bad legislation due to its
failure to learn a crucial lesson from art law: if the government seeks to adequately
preserve cultural property, it must in some way force states owning cultural
property to actually follow through with protectionist policies."' Regardless, it is
important to understand that the ASA is clearly a form of cultural property law
whose fundamental purpose is to protect and preserve artifacts of historical value
and significance.
2 6
IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA v.
DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC.
On Friday, July 28, 1865, the Brother Jonathan, a 220 foot wooden steamship
headed for Portland, Oregon, collided against a submerged rock off the Pacific
coast of Northern California. 27 The ship carried to its watery grave an abundant
amount of valuable cargo, including cash, gold coins, and bullion.' 28 In October
1993, after 138 years of wet isolation, Deep Sea Research, Inc., discovered the
wreck site of the Brother Jonathan about four miles off the coast of Crescent City,
120. Id. at § 2103.
121. See Mclaughlin, supra note 3. at 149.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 150. In this light, the ASA makes sense because the original proponents of the ASA
said the Act was important because by vesting title to the states, private salvors would be kept from
plundering and destroying wrecks and underwater objects that have historical significance. See id. at
151.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Deep Sea Research. Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan. 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1346-47 (N.D. Cal.
1995), aff'd en ban', 102 F.3d 372 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc.. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
128. See id.
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California.'29 Deep Sea Research had spent nineteen years searching for the ship 30
and had previously paid the insurance companies who insured the ship for any
ownership rights they still possessed to the boat.''
As is typical when salvors discover shipwrecks, Deep Sea Research quickly
instituted an in rem proceeding in federal court, claiming a maritime lien against
the ship and seeking a court order appointing Deep Sea Research the sole salvor of
the vessel and its cargo. 32  California, however, voluntarily intervened and
contended that the State had proper ownership rights of the ship under the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987,' or in the alternative, under State law.3 4
Furthermore, California claimed that because the State was now a party to the
claim, the Eleventh Amendment'35 barred the federal court from deciding any issue
of who held proper ownership to the ship and its contents.'36 California further
sought a motion to dismiss the claim by Deep Sea Research from federal court.' 3
However because the Constitution gives federal courts original jurisdiction in
admiralty cases, 3 ' the district court sought to clarify the issue of whether or not the
salvage company's claim could be heard in federal court.'3 9
Because the Brother Jonathan did not meet the requirements of the ASA.4 ° the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied
California's sovereign immunity defense and held that the claim was subject to
federal courtjurisdiction. 4' The court simultaneously awarded Deep Sea Research
a warrant to arrest the ship and sole rights to salvorship of the ship and its cargo,
an award contrary to California law. 4 2 Adding insult to injury, the court also held
that the ASA, a federal law, preempted California's shipwreck law.'43 The Court
129. See id. at 1347.
130. See Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d at 382.
131. See id.
132. See Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. at 1347.
133. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 - 2106 (West 1998).
134. See BrotherJonathan. 883 F. Supp. at 1347: see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6313 (West 1998)
(setting out a much broader law than the ASA which mandates that California obtains title to al
abandoned shipwrecks within its territorial waters, without any limitations).
135. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI.
136. See Brother Jonathat, 883 F. Supp. at 1347.
137. See id.
138. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1.
139. See generally Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. at 1347-65 (taking a backwards approach to
address this issue: the court looked first to see if the ASA applied, which then would determine whether
California could assert Eleventh Amendment immunity).
140. See id. at 1351-57 (finding that the Brother Jonathan did not fall under any of the three classes
of protected shipwrecks under the ASA). To observe the protected classes under the ASA, see supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
14 1. See Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
142. See id. at 1364. California's Code is much broader than the ASA, transferring title to all
shipwrecks discovered in California's watery realms to the State. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6313
(West 1998).
143. See Brother Jonlathan. 883 F. Supp. at 1363.
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects.' 44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to "address whether a State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity in an in rem admiralty action depends upon
evidence of the State's ownership of the [property] .. .. ,,14' Also, the Court sought
to undertake "the related questions [of] whether the Brother Jonathan [was] subject
to the ASA and whether the ASA pre-empt[ed] [California Code] § 6313.' ' 4
V. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling. 4' Justice O'Connor
began by noting that the district and appellate courts in this case diverged from the
rulings of other appellate courts by requiring California to "prove its claim to the
Brother Jonathan by a preponderance of the evidence in order to invoke the
immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. . .[because other] Courts of
Appeals... have held that a State need only make a bare assertion to ownership
of a res."' 48 Continuing, Justice O'Connor recounted the fact that the Constitution
grants original jurisdiction to the federal courts in admiralty cases.'49 According
to Justice O'Connor, the founders' purpose in vesting such power to the federal
courts was in recognition of the need for a uniform body of law applicable equally
throughout the nation.'50
Justice O'Connor continued the analysis by citing to the Eleventh
Amendment' and its broad grant of immunity to states from being sued by their
own citizens in federal court. 12 Noting that the Court previously had not explained
how the Eleventh Amendment interplays with the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
144. See Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1996).
145. Deep Sea Research. Inc., 523 U.S. at 500.
146. lI. at 500-501.
147. See id. at 494.
148. i. at 500. As support for its proposition, the Court noted, for example, Zych v. Wrecked Vessel
Believed to be the Lady Elgin, 960 F.2d 665,670 (1992) (holding that It Ihe strength of the state's legal
position is irrelevant; the eleventh amendment prevents the districtjudge from exercising jurisdiction."
in an in rein admiralty case).
149. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 501 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. IIl § 2. cl. I).
150. See id. Specifically, the Justice clarified that this jurisdiction encompasses "maritime causes
of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as
the offender and made the defendant ...."' (quoting Madruga v. Superior Court. 346 U.S. 556, 560
(1954)). id.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
152. See Deep Sea Research. 523 U.S. at 501-502 (citing Hans v. Louisiana. 134 U.S. I (1890)).
courts in an in rem action, Justice O'Connor analyzed how the Court and its prior
justices interpreted the interaction between the two.' Quoting early Court
justices,'54 Justice O'Connor proposed that as originally interpreted, the federal
court could passjudgment in an in rem case involving disposition of property, even
where a state made immunity objections. 15 Later decisions,'56 she noted, carved
some exceptions to federal court authority, thus giving rise to instances where the
Eleventh Amendment could be successfully used as ajurisdictional shield by states
in cases of in rem admiralty.'57
Referencing the recent keystone case of Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,'58 which mirrored some similar issues to DSR, Justice O'Connor
extensively analyzed Treasure Salvors."5 9 In Treasure Salvors, the Court held that
because the State of Florida did not have a "colorable claim"'60 of possession over
the ship at issue, the State could not invoke an Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional
shield.' 6' The "colorable claim" issue also was at the crux of deciding DSR
according to Justice O'Connor. 62 Justice O'Connor distinguished DSR from
Treasure Salvors,'63 however, noting that unlike the State of Florida in Treasure
Salvors, California never actually possessed the Brother Jonathan or its cargo at the
153. See Deep Sea Research. 523 U.S. at 502.
154. The justices quoted were Justice Story (1891 ) and Justice Washington (1809). See J. Story.
Commentaries on the Const. of the United States. § 1689, 491-92 (5th ed. 1891). See also United
States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232. 1236 No. 14,647 (C.C. Pa. 1809). Justice Story opined that in an in
rem admiralty action "'the jurisdiction of the [federal] court is founded upon the possession of the thing:
and if the State should interpose a claim for the property, it does not act merely in the character of a
defendant, but as an actor"'. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 502 (citations omitted).
155. See 0. (citations omitted).
156. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); see also Ex parte New York. 256 U.S. 503
(1921).
157. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503.
158. 458 U.S. 670(1982).
159. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503.
160. After salvors discovered a ship with hordes of bullion, Florida claimed ownership rights but
lacked any legal authority to do so, hence lacking a colorable claim in the property. See Treastre
Salvors, 458 U.S. at 697. Usually a "colorable claim" is met when a state makes a bare assertion to
ownership in some property, though both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Court for
the Northern District of California required the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
California had a valid ownership claim to the Brother Jonathan under the criteria of the ASA, thus
imposing a much higher standard for the State to meet in demonstrating a colorable claim. See Deep
Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 503.
161. See Deep Sea Research. 523 U.S. at 503.
162. See id. at 504.
163. The Court primarily compared the case at bar to Treasure Salvors. but distinguished the two
because in Treasure Salvors the State at least claimed some possessory rights to the ship, even though
it was unlawful, whereas in DSR the State never possessed the ship when the State intervened. See id.
at 505-06. Furthermore, the Court rejected the proposition that federal courts lacked authority to
adjudicate property claims by states as held in Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe (?f daho, 521 U.S. 261,
276-78 (1997), since the in rein admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts is a specialized and separate
jurisdiction of the federal courts from their general jurisdictional powers. See Deep Sea Research, 523
U.S. at 506.
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time Deep Sea Research first made their claim in the District Court."6
To give additional credence to her argument, Justice O'Connor lastly
compared the doctrine of sovereign immunity allowed in an in rem admiralty
proceeding by the Federal Government versus that permissible by the states.'65 She
made the comparison through a brief examination of various old cases.'66 After
doing so she held that the State could not impose a bar of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity "[b]ased on longstanding precedent respecting the federal
courts' assumption of in rem admiralty jurisdiction over vessels that are not in the
possession of a sovereign .... ,167 Thus, she revested the District Court with the
necessary jurisdictional authority to determine who has valid ownership rights to
the Brother Jonathan, Deep Sea Research or the State of California.'68
In light of her Eleventh Amendment holding, Justice O'Connor remanded to
the district court the issue of whether the Brother Jonathan was truly abandoned
under the ASA. '69 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor decided that because the district
court would need to reevaluate the issue of abandonment, there was no need for the
Court to consider pre-emption issues. 7 ° Thus, the Court did not discuss whether
the ASA preempted California's abandoned shipwreck statute.' 7' Lastly, aside
from the federal jurisdictional issue, Justice O'Connor vacated the decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
72
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence. 73  He acknowledged a previous
erroneous assumption on the part of himself and other justices that the Eleventh
Amendment was as uniformly applicable to in rem admiralty actions as it was to
164. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506.
165. See id. at 506-08.
166. Justice O'Connor cited to old cases such as The Pesaro. 255 U.S. 216, 219 (1921 ); Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 213 (1897); The Davis, 77 U.S. 15 (1869), and The Siren. 19 L.Ed. 129 (1868).
all of which held that federal sovereign immunity can only be used in an in rem proceeding where the
sovereign actually
possesses the property at issue. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 502.
167. See Deep Sea Research. 523 U.S. at 507.
168. See id at 508.
169. See id. Justice O'Connor observed that the record before the Court was confined to the
preliminary issue faced by the District Court of whether the Eleventh Amendment applied to the case
at hand, and thus refused to resolve the further issue of whether the Brother Jonathan was truly
abandoned as defined by the ASA. See id. at 508-09.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 509.
all other cases where property claims were at issue.'74 Because of the attention
Justice O'Connor gave to statements made by prior Supreme Court Justices,1
7 5
however, Justice Stevens conceded that in rem admiralty cases are clearly to be
treated differently from other property actions where a state seeks Eleventh
Amendment immunity.17 1 Hence, he opined that California should be subject to
federal jurisdiction in this case. '77
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices' Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a separate
two sentence concurring opinion.'78 Despite his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
asserted that the distinction brought up by Justice O'Connor of possession versus
non-possession by a state in an in rem proceeding was not well embedded in prior
law. "'79 Thus, he contended that the correctness of the majority's differentiation
was open to reconsideration. 80
VI. IMPACTS OF DSR
A. Effects on Bankruptcy and Other areas of law
There are clear "parallels between federal district court jurisdiction over
vessels in admiralty cases and district court/bankruptcy court... jurisdiction over
property of bankruptcy estates ...."18' Hence, various lawyers have recently
argued that the holding in DSR - that the federal court's jurisdiction trumps
Eleventh Amendment rights - could be extended to bankruptcy proceedings. 82
Applying the "DSR exception" in the bankruptcy context would mean that a state's
ability to invoke an Eleventh Amendment immunity would be ineffective in federal
bankruptcy court. '8 In fact, expanding the DSR exception to bankruptcy could
have such important repercussions on bankruptcy law that some view the exception
to be "the most fertile basis for change" in bankruptcy law, having the potential for
"enormous implications in bankruptcy."' 84
Of course, others predict that federal bankruptcy proceedings will not apply
174. See id.
175. See id. (referring to id. at 502, which quoted Justices' Story and Washington for their
explanation that states cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity where a federal court is
adjudicating an in rein admiralty proceeding).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See, Mark Browning. A Magic Bullet to Beat Semfinole?, 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 10, 10(1998).
182. See id. at 13.
183. See id.
184. See Leonard H. Gerson, Recent Developments in Applving the Seminole Tribe Doctrine. 32 No.
23 Bankr. Ct. Decisions 3 (Aug. 18, 1998) (emphasis added).
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DSR. "' Apart from its application to in rem admiralty cases, they argue that DSR
has no applicability because the Court in DSR stated that "it was not addressing any
other circumstances in which in rem jurisdiction exceptions might apply."'86 By
the same token, however, because the Court did not specifically preclude extension
of DSR to other areas of law, the DSR exception appears to be a loose cannon that
may encompass bankruptcy and possibly other types of federal proceedings
currently unforseen.'87
B. On States
1. Effects on All States
The likely outcome of the Court's holding will affect every state in one way
or another.'88 This is apparent by the blatant implication of the Court's decision on
principles of federalism. 9 "The extent of the Eleventh Amendment is crucial to
solving questions of federalism", 9 ° and the Court's decision clearly professes that
the States' Eleventh Amendment protection is simply not as important as the
federal courts' jurisdiction over in rem admiralty cases.91
2. Effects On Specific States
Despite its possible effects on federalism towards all states, DSR has special
implications to those states which border oceans or which have large bodies of
water in their territories because the Court's decision is, for the time being at least,
strictly limited to admiralty cases. 92 These ocean-bordering states demonstrated
DSR's importance by filing amicus curie briefs in support of California's
185. See To the Editor. Response to 'Recent Developmen~ts in Applving Seminole Tribe Doctrine'.
32 No. 25 Bankr. Ct. Decisions 3 (Sept. I. 1998).
186. See id.
187. Cf Gerson. sulpra note 184, at 3 (comparing the similarities outlining the federal courts'
jurisdiction over admiralty and bankruptcy cases).
188. See infra notes 189-207 and accompanying text;
189. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 481. 507-08 (1998) (holding that federal
jurisdiction trumps the Eleventh Amendment).
190. Bederman. supra note 27. at 938; .f Farrell, slpral note 69. A I (quoting an assistant attorney
general for Florida: "The ability to control the archeological preservation and recovery of abandoned
shipwrecks is at stake in the Deep Sea case.*).
191. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 507-08.
192. See getterally. id. (limiting the decision to in ren admiralty proceedings).
position.' By requiring everyone who makes a claim to a shipwreck to litigate in
federal court, states included, DSR's holding proves to be harsh for states with
ownership claims. The practical effect is that states no longer have the right to wait
and see if a federal court will find disfavorably towards the state and then, as a
separate independent sovereign, have the state courts retry the whole affair."94
In addition to the problems noted above, states generally see the resources on
their submerged lands as part of each state's own treasury.'95 Thus, some state
authorities claim DSR diminishes a state's ability to have sovereignty over its own
laws and resources, equating DSR to an invasion of the state's treasury by private
salvors. '
Also, because the ASA is so broad in its grasp on almost all shipwrecks found
in a state's territorial water, it appears that the ASA will be the prevailing law over
any state law. 9 ' Of course, this is questionable since the Supreme Court refused
to answer this precise issue in DSR, 95 but it seems clear enough that similar to
other supremacy issues, federal shipwreck law trumps state law.'99 It was due to
federal supremacy grounds that both lower courts in DSR concluded that the ASA
pre-empted California's law.2' One of DSR's probable impacts, then, is to limit
the states ability to handle abandoned shipwreck issues according to a valid
exercise of their police power in a manner they deem adequate. -'
193. See David G. Savage, High Court to Weigh Claims to Steamer Wrecked in 1865, L.A. TIMES,
June 10. 1997, at A3 [hereinafter Steamer] (recognizing that the general consensus among the states
who filed briefs is that governments should have authority to determine the fate of historic shipwrecks).
For the list of the fifteen states, see Richard Carelli, High Court to Decide Rights to Shipwreck,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 10, 1997. at A4.
194. See Laurie Asseo, Court Hears Dispute Over Sunilken Gold Calif Seeking Possession of 1865
Shipwreck, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, BEE, Dec. 2, 1997, at A 12 (Justice Ginsburg said that "such
a policy would be impractical.").
195. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 673-74 (1982) (stating
that Florida claimed the bullion discovered by a salvor as belonging to the State's treasury): Laurie
Asseo, High Court Tries to Decide Who Owns Shipwreck, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 7, 1997, at
A20 (noting that California's view of the property found by salvors was that it was part of the State's
treasury).
196. See Asseo, supra note 195, at A12 (stating that the suit is "as if our treasury was being
invaded").
197. See supra notes 68 and I I I and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
199. Based on federal preemption principles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "Iiln
adopting the ASA. Congress preempted state laws which purportll to take title to ... shipwrecks."
Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan. 102 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granlted sub
nom. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
200. See Deep Sea Research. Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1357-58 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (defining three situations where federal law pre-empts state law, the case at bar containing one
of those situations because the state and federal law actually conflict in this case); 102 F.3d at 384.
201. This is precisely what happened to California when the appellate court declared the State's
shipwreck law to be subordinate to the ASA and invalidated the State statute to the degree it did not
conform with the ASA. See Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d at 384. Luckily for California. the Supreme
Court vacated this holding by the appellate court. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 504. But as
long as lower federal courts hold that the ASA preempts conflicting state laws. it will be "infinitely more
[Vol. 27: 657, 2000] Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The last and possibly largest effect on states after DSR is that they will have
to meet an extremely high barrier in order to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity
in a federal court in rem admiralty action.2 °2 The barrier is especially harsh for
states not only because of the Court's decision in DSR, but also because in the
fairly recent case of Treasure Salvors, "-° the Court held that even if the state had
possession of an abandoned shipwreck, the state would have to prove that its claim
to the property was "colorable".2' Determining the degree of colorability required
a look at the merits of the case..20 5 Like the Court in Treasure Salvors, the District
Court for the Northern District of California similarly reviewed the merits of
California's claim in DSR to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment
applied.2' Thus, the problem under both DSR and Treasure Salvors is that "'[i]f
a state has to prove the merits of its ownership claim in order to establish its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, then it [effectively] has no Eleventh Amendment
immunity."'' - 7 Of what real value, then, is the Eleventh Amendment to states in an
in rem admiralty case at all?
C. Effects of Leaving Some Important Issues Open
After DSR, the Court, at minimum, left open three very important issues. The
first is the issue of what is abandonment?2 8 The effect of leaving this issue open
is that the lower courts will continue to struggle over the definition of abandon-
ment, while forcing parties to litigate their claims to determine if the ASA even
applies to their claim(s). 2°
The second remaining issue is to what degree must a claim be colorable for a
difficult for states to manage historic abandoned vessels on their property.- See Carelli. supra note 193.
at A4.
202. See Deep Sea Research. 523 U.S. at 503 (holding that a state must have actual possession of
the sunken property at issue in order to successfully use sovereign immunity).
203. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
204. /I. at 697.
205. See generaly *%id. at 683-700 (examining, for example, whether State officials were acting within
valid statutory authority).
206. Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan. 883 F. Supp. 1343. 1351-54 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(looking at the evidence to see if the Brother Jonathan was ever abandoned), aff'd e bane. 102 F.3d
379 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. grantedsub norn. California v. Deep Sea Research. Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
207. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d at 385 (quoting argument of the State of California as to why the
district court erred) (emphasis added).
208. See Frederick, supra note II. at C03.
209. See id.
state to be able to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity? 2 ° Although the Court's
holding makes this question moot for an in rem proceeding where the state has no
possessory claims, the Court's failure to be clear on this issue will cause continued
confusion as to the degree of colorability a state must prove when the state makes
at least some claim of possession.2' The most the Court was willing to say on this
issue was that the district and appellate courts who decided the case had applied an
awkwardly high standard. 2'2
The last major issue left open concerns what power states have after DSR to
recover money or articles discovered in their submerged lands? -13 Currently, some
states have laws which allow for private recovery if the state receives a share of the
profits, while others do not allow for private recovery at all.21 4 This third
unanswered issue raises various sub-questions. For example, can a state recover
any portion of government ships discovered? 25 Should the state be allowed any
portion of a sunken ship owned by the state?216  Or to what degree should
international and other admiralty laws play into a states share in ships discovered
in state waters which belong to foreign governments?
21 7
D. Effects on Salvors
The consequences of the Court's decision on private salvors is not clear, but
most likely DSR will prove a boon for these treasure hunters. 28 DSR appears to
give added incentive for salvors to continue in their trade of searching for sunken
ships and abandoned treasure.- It is important to understand that salvors often
make large expenditures of their own time and money, as well as spending the
210. Both lower courts examined the issue of whether California's claim to the ship was colorable
enough to impose sovereign immunity. See Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343 at 1349; see also
Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d at 383. However, the Supreme Court did not address this issue. See Deep
Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 501-02.
211. See John D. Cox, Court to Decide Fate of Sunken Ship, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 28. 1997. at
A I (noting that federal appellate courts are split in their interpretations of how bald an assertion can be
by a state before it lacks sufficient colorability).
212. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
213. See Frederick, supra note II. at C03 (noting, for example, that currently Texas entirely prohibits
private companies or salvors from recovering shipwrecks for profit, while Florida and Virginia allow
it as long as they receive a cut of the proceeds); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text.
214. See Frederick, supra note II, at C03.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Editorials. Finders. Keepers Gold Rush Calfinnia Steanmer Brother Jonathan Shipwreck
Deep Sea Research LAS VEGAS REV.-JOUR.. May 2, 1998. at 12B [hereinafter Keepersl (opining that
the DSR salvors won huge victory for salvor rights).
219. Because states will now be largely burdened in their efforts to use the Eleventh Amendment,
see infira notes 202-07 and accompanying text, the logical effect is that salvors will be more apt to
search for treasure because of the commercial incentives involved in finding treasures lost at sea. See
Farrell. supra note 69. at AI (submitting that as long as states do not take away the commercial
incentives, that divers will continue to search for abandoned shipwrecks).
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resources of other investors.22'  For example, there were approximately one-
hundred investors of modest means who participated in the search for the Brother
Jonathan.22' Their pooled investment topped over one million dollars. 2-2 This price
tag, attached to the fact that the ship took over twenty years22 to find, made for no
small stakes to the investors. However, the potential returns from treasure hunting
can be behemoth.22 ' For example, the Brother Jonathan and its artifacts have an
estimated value somewhere between twenty-five and 108 million dollars. 22' These
high stakes play an especially important role for salvors and investors when, as
with the Brother Jonathan, there are numerous salvors racing to discover the same
shipwreck.226 Thus, it is obvious that the business of treasure hunting is not to be
taken lightly and any Court decision affecting the industry is crucial in its
consequences on many salvors, investors and untold millions of dollars.22  As
such, the Court's DSR holding is very important to the industry.22'8
220. See, e.g., John Aloysius Farrell, Justices to Rule if Same-Sex Harassment is Covered by Law,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A29 (noting that Deep Sea Research, Inc. paid money to two
insurance companies for ownership rights to the Brother Jonathan and spent almost two decades
searching for the ship).
22 I. See David G. Savage, California and the West Court Rejects State's Claim to Historic Ship
Savage: Justices Say Federal Maritime Courts Must Decide Whether Treasure-Hunting Company
Owns Steamer That Sank in 1865 With $2 Million Aboard, L.A. TIMES. Apr. 23, 1998, at A3
Ihereinafter "$2 million"l.
222. See id.
223. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Ponder New Ltaw of the Sea, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, Dec. 2, 1997, at 12A.
224. See Nicholson, sotpra note 95, at 140 (observing that treasure hunters often harvest artifacts
worth millions of dollars) see, e.g., Aaron Epstein, Legal Fights Surface Over Sunken Treasure High-
Tech Sea Hunits Stir Up Debate About Money and Historn, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR. Jan. 2, 1999. at B6
(noting that Mel Fisher's discovery of the Atocha in 1985 has an estimated value of $400 million dollars
in emeralds and coins made of gold and silver).
225. See Steamer, supra note 193, at A3. This includes the value of a United States Army payroll
and over 1,000 gold coins pulled from the wreckage. See Epstein, supra note 224. at B6.
226. See Cox, supra note 211, at Al.
227. There are an estimated 5000 sunken ships along the nation's coastlines still waiting to be
discovered. See $2 million, supra note 22 1, at A3. The legal debates over who should control these
and other wrecks is important inasmuch as the hunt by salvors to find lost treasure is continually
increasing. See Epstein, supra note 224, at B6; see also Stevens. supra note 84. at 575 (asserting that
more and more people are pursuing the business of treasure hunting because of newer technologies).
228. Most salvors should view DSR as a good decision because it minimizes state interference on
the industry. Cf Nicholson, supra note 95. at 138 (stating that the prevailing attitude among treasure
hunters is that the less regulation the better); (f also Epstein, supra note 224, at B6 (pointing out that
laws which provide incentives to search for shipwrecks are crucial if treasure hunters are going to
continue to have motivation to invest money exploring); Keepers. supra note 218, at 12B (noting that
the Court's ruling is a boon to Deep Sea Research): Associated Press. Court Rtes on Sunken Ship -
Savs Federal Courts Have Power to Resolve Ownership Claims, SACRAMENTO BEE. Apr. 23. 1998.
at A5 (remarking that the Court's decision essentially gives lower courts the incentive to award Deep
679
Regardless of the Court's favorable holding, some argue that the ASA leaves
salvors with no incentive at all because it grants title to almost all shipwrecks
discovered on United States territory to the states..2 29 Hence, these ASA opponents
argue that the only real incentive left to salvors is to search for sunken wrecks in
deeper international waters. 230 However, deep diving often requires very expensive
high-tech equipment.2 ' Furthermore, if salvors fail to search and discover
shipwrecks in state territories, the states who currently have hidden shipwrecks will
receive no benefit from wrecks which either they could own and exploit, or for
which they stand to gain financially through salvage agreements 32
The Court failed to define "abandonment" under the ASA. -33 As such, salvors
cannot be sure if they are wasting money and time searching for wrecks which, if
found, will become automatic property of the government.3 4 In this light, DSR is
not a good decision for treasure hunters since they will likely expend great
resources searching for ships only to find that they will have to spend much more
in litigation to find out who owns the discovery.235
As a historical note, treasure hunters were traditionally seen as daring heroes
who should be handsomely rewarded for their efforts. 236  But largely due to
environmentalists and archeologists, salvors have been more recently viewed as
Sea Research the Brother Jonathan and its artifacts).
229. See Horrell, supra note 41, at 347.
230. See id. This is a logical reaction because many salvors feel that the state is the enemy and that
the state's greedy desires over the property discovered by salvors is insatiable. See Epstein, supra note
224, at B6 (warning treasure hunters that the government should be salvors biggest fear because of its
covetousness).
231. See Horrell, supra note 38, at 314 (noting that deep ocean exploration requires high-tech
equipment that costs several million dollars and that this expense creates the largest disincentive for
deeper shipwreck exploration): see also id. at 342 (noting that deeper dives require equipment such as
remote-operated-vehicles (ROV's) and submersibles which explore vast depths); Epstein, supra note
224, at B6 (commenting that robots are essential in exploring depths that scuba divers cannot).
232. See, e.g., supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text; see also Epstein, supra note 224, at B6
(relating that governments generally want to protect artifacts for the public benefit and often want part
of the profits derived from salvaging, but also opining that shipwreck regulations must assure adequate
incentives for salvors to continue in their trade).
233. See supra, notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
234. See Frederick, supra note II, at C03 (observing that "[ulntil the courts definitively resolve the
meaning of 'abandoned,' interested parties in shipwreck cases will be forced to litigate over when the
ASA applies and when it does not."). Justice O'Connor, specifically discussing this point during oral
arguments, asked the lawyer for Deep Sea Research what the result would be if the Court were to
determine the wreck to be legally abandoned. See James Kilpatrick. Tragedy at Sea Makes for Meaty
Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. II, 1997. at 07B. The lawyer, responding to Justice
O'Connor. said the result would be that the company would receive "nothing". See id.
235. For example, David Flohr, one of the investors in Deep Sea Research, Inc., stated that the
litigation over who owns the Brother Jonathan was a legal nightmare. See Cox, supra note 211. at A l.
See also sulpra note 234 and accompanying text.
236. See Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 63, 80 (1991 ).
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plunderers. 237 However, DSR has the social impact of raising the industry to the
level of commercialists with viable interests.
238
One final positive outcome of the Court's decision deserves discussion. The
traditional purposes of the laws of salvage and finds is to reward the risk, difficulty,
and efforts of endeavors to recover ships and their goods. 239 Allowing federal
courts who have little interest in the outcome of abandoned shipwreck cases to
adjudicate these claims will force states to litigate in front of objective federal
judges instead of state judges who are funded by and subject to the states.2"4 Thus,
states will be kept from disregarding the travails of private salvors by easily
removing claims to state court.24 ' Hence, the traditional purposes of admiralty law
will be better served under the Court's holding, allowing salvors to be handsomely
rewarded for their discovery efforts. 24
2
E. Effects on Courts
One of the best impacts of DSR is that it clears up previous confusion in lower
courts about the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to in rem admiralty
cases. 24 3 Also, the decision is a positive one for salvors seeking justice and
competence in the court system because federal courts unquestionably have greater
expertise in maritime cases than state courts.
244
F. Effects On Litigation
DSR will probably increase the amount of litigation in light of the crucial
237. See Mclaughlin. supra note 3. at 151 (commenting that "Islponsors of the ASA feared that
shipwreck salvage as conducted by private salvors was a form of plunder"); see also Nicholson, stpra
note 95 at 138 (noting the concern of archaeologists and preservationalists over salvors emphasis on
the economic value of shipwrecks instead of their historic importance, because an economic focus
cheapens the historical importance of shipwrecks).
238. See Asseo, supra note 195, at A20 (submitting that the Court had little sympathy for California.
noting Justice O'Connor's concern that Deep Sea Research, Inc. be rewarded for their efforts).
239. See Farrell, supra note 69, at Al.
240. See cf. $2 million, supra note 221, at A3 (discerning that DSR means that federal maritime
courts will now hear shipwreck cases despite state efforts to remove cases out of federal court, and
noting also the statement by one of the lawyers for Deep Sea Research. Inc. who said that he was
pleased with the Court's decision).
241. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text for a reminder of the type of investments salvors
often make.
243. See Cox. supra note 211, at Al.
244. See Frederick, sumpra note I1, at C03.
issues still left open by the Court245 and because abandoned shipwreck cases are
notoriously litigious. 246 This is especially true because DSR will force the courts
to decide carefully the applicability of the ASA to particular litigants on a case by
case basis. 247
G. Effects on Archeologists and the Environment
Because DSR is such an asset to salvors, the decision, without question, strikes
a reciprocal blow to archeologists in light of their desires to preserve historical
artifacts, an interest in juxtaposition to the economic aims of salvors to sale
antiquated artifacts to the highest bidder.-48 Additionally, encouraging salvors to
search for treasure indirectly increases harm to underwater environments in view
of the typical methods used to salvage: blasting, dredging, winching, and blow
torching the ocean floor.249 Thus, environmentalists lose through the DSR decision,
too.
2
.
50
H. Effects on the Public at Large
Possibly the worst consequence of DSR is that which will be bourne by the
public.2'" The public suffers a potentially huge loss because by giving salvors
increased incentive to discover and sell shipwreck artifacts to private buyers, the
public will be deprived of the historical, educational, and cultural benefits
otherwise available to it by having the state manage the shipwreck and its artifacts
on behalf of the people.25 2 On the flip side, however, DSR may actually prove to
245. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
246. See Cox, supra note 211, at Al.
247. See $2 million, supra note 22 1, at A3.
248. See Farrell, supra note 69, at A I (opining that placing shipwrecks and artifacts into the stream
of commerce instead of preserving them unfairly benefits the few over the many, an effect which the
ASA was specifically designed to prohibit): see also id. (noting that DSR was a war between salvors
and archeologists).
249. See Miller, stipra note 74, at 796 (professing that these salvage methods are commonly used
because they are the least expensive means to remove artifacts).
250. See Stevens. supra note 84. at 577 (pointing out that traditional salvage methods destroy the
environment).
251. This depends on what one considers to be a terrible impact. However, it is clear that the
underlying purpose most countries have in creating shipwreck law is to respect the concept that
shipwrecks are part of the cultural heritage of mankind, thus belonging to the public as a whole, not to
individuals. See Stevens, stipra note 84, at 592.
252. See Farrell. supra note 69. at Al (contending that privately salvaging shipwrecks for
commercial gain unfairly places antiquities into the hands of a few people instead of the public at large,
an effect which the ASA was specifically designed to prohibit); see also $2 million, supra note 22 1, at
A3 (submitting that California's efforts to preserve the wrecks found on its submerged lands for public
purposes was setback by DSR). There is an opposing view which maintains that the public does not
lose out when salvors have incentives to explore, but that the reverse is actually true. See Nicholson,
.supra note 95, at 138. This is because it is the salvors, not the states, who typically have the resources
to search for shipwrecks. Id. Thus, if treasure hunters are stripped of economic inducements, no one
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be beneficial to the public in at least one regard. People are always looking for
others who symbolize adventure and heroism, and treasure hunters fill this need for
many people by sparking the public's imagination.-
L Effects on Technology Companies
Because DSR spurs the treasure hunting industry, it also has the logical effect,
however big or small, of promoting technology companies to continue developing
the new equipment that makes treasure hunting possible.25 As long as the need
exists, technology companies will continue to develop innovative technology to use
in searching the seas.255
J. Effects on People Who Have Family or Friends Lost At Sea
Treasure hunters who disturb ships on which people perished will always
affect those who are in some way close to persons lost at sea.256 Many complain
that authorities allow such ships to be touched at all because they are, in effect, the
caskets of those killed.257 Similar to its implications on technology, even though
the affects may be slight, it is no strain of reason to see that DSR is likely to affect
the survivors of persons lost at sea by giving increased incentives for salvors to
search for and disturb the wrecks that also serve as watery coffins.
258
VII. CONCLUSION
Obviously DSR clarifies the important issue of when a state cannot claim
sovereign immunity in an in rem admiralty proceeding.259 But the Court's decision
has left the door of litigation wide open for future decisions regarding other
will search for wrecks and the "sea will retain its ill-gotten bounty and the secrets of ages past." Id.
Thus, everyone loses, the public included. Id.
253. See Keepers, supra note 218, at 12B.
254. See Farrell, supra note 69, at Al (observing that it is new technology that makes the continued
discovery of many ships possible, such as happened with the Titanic and the Lusitania).
255. See id.
256. See generally Nicholson, supra note 95, at 140 (asserting that "[s]ome of the most adamant
opponents to the exploration of shipwrecks are the relatives of those who lost their lives when ... [a]
ship sank.").
257. See Frederick, supra note 11, at C03.
258. See id. This protectionistic perspective of shipwrecks views the artifacts contained in and
around the wreck site as sacred, similar to placing items with the deceased in their graves. See
Nicholson, supra note 95, at 140.
259. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
important issues which DSR failed to address.260 In the meantime, the decision will
likely force salvors and states alike to continue wasting unnecessary time and
money in efforts to protect rights which they cannot even be sure they own.26 1
Despite its weaknesses, however, DSR clearly appears to be a boon for treasure
salvors and a simultaneous blow to state sovereignty. 6 2 Furthermore, extending
DSR's Eleventh Amendment exception to areas of law outside of admiralty is a
very real possibility with unknown implications. 2 63 In the end, even though the
Court still has a long journey ahead in clarifying the scope and limits of the ASA,
it has at least taken the colossal first step of tightening the reigns on the Eleventh
Amendment to increase salvors chances of having their claims adjudicated in
federal court. - 4
PAUL NEIL
260. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
261. See Farrell, supra note 220, at A29 (claiming that the conflicting standards imposed by the
lower courts over interpretational issues such as how to define 'abandonment' under the ASA will
unquestionably lead to increased litigation); see also Editorials, The 'Brother Jonathan' Shipwreck, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 1998, at A24 (observing that the battle between Deep Sea Research,
Inc. and California over who owned the Brother Jonathan had been going on since 1993).
262. See supra notes 218-28 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 189-91 and accompanying
text.
263. See Browning, supra note 181, at 13 (speculating that DSR may "prove to be the proverbial
magic bullet to defeat states' Eleventh Amendment [immunity]").
264. See Steamer, supra note 193, at A3 (prophesying that DSR will have a broad effect on salvors).
Cf $2 million, supra note 22 1, at A3 (stating that DSR dealt a blow to California because the Court
denied the State's ability to use the Eleventh Amendment to protect wrecks within its borders).
684
